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ABSTRACT  
As multinational enterprises (MNEs) increasingly disaggregate and disperse corporate 
headquarters (CHQ) activities, the allocation of regional management mandates (RMMs) to 
local operating subsidiaries is becoming more common. RMMs explicitly break with the 
traditional assumption of a clear separation between centralised and local decision-making. 
Yet we know little of how RMMs are enacted by the units involved, or how they evolve over 
time. Based on a case study of Unilever, we find that RMMs are inherently ambiguous, and 
identify circumstances under which ambiguity manifests and triggers cycles of sensemaking 
and sensegiving about the meaning of the mandate. These cycles result in the co-construction 
of the mandate by multiple units, with changes in RMM scope and governance over time. We 
also find that sensemaking and sensegiving are most intense among boundary-spanning 
middle managers. Our work challenges prevailing assumptions that mandates are largely 
unambiguous when assigned and are unilateral or dyadic accomplishments; demonstrates the 
importance of sub-unit level analysis in MNEs; and highlights the potential of structuration 
theory to enrich our understanding of sensemaking and sensegiving in organisations.  
 
KEYWORDS 
Ambiguity; Co-construction; Regional Management Mandates; Sensemaking; Sensegiving; 
Structuration Theory 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in critically examining the role of 
corporate headquarters, or CHQ (e.g. Ciabuschi et al., 2012; Egelhoff, 2010; Menz et al., 
2015; Nell and Ambos, 2013). CHQ activities are progressively unbound from a single unit 
and performed at various levels and locations within the multinational enterprise (MNE). 
MNEs are, for example, disaggregating and dispersing core parts of CHQ activities (e.g. Baaij 
et al., 2015; Baaij and Slangen, 2013; Birkinshaw et al., 2006); establishing regional 
headquarters (e.g. Chakravarty et al., 2017; Nell et al., 2011) or intermediate parents (Goold 
and Campbell, 2002); and assigning regional management mandates or creating similar 
‘virtual’ setups (e.g. Alfoldi et al., 2012; Baaij and Slangen, 2013; Menz et al., 2015; Piekkari 
et al., 2010). As Menz and colleagues (2015, p.668) observe, however, there is a continuing 
need to ‘better understand how the CHQ deals with a complex portfolio of heterogeneous 
business and international units […] considering several organizational layers.’ 
In this paper, we examine how distributed HQ activities are enacted (i.e. interpreted 
and ‘put into practice’) by local operating subsidiaries which are mandated to oversee and 
manage subsidiaries in other countries. MNE subsidiaries that are assigned such regional 
management mandates or RMMs (Alfoldi, Clegg and McGaughey, 2012) are often local 
implementers focused on primary value chain activities (such as sales and marketing) in their 
local market (see Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991). Empirical evidence of widespread and 
growing use of RMMs is accumulating (e.g. Chakravarty et al., 2017; Schotter et al., this 
issue). However, unlike dedicated administrative regional headquarters (RHQs), subsidiaries 
with RMMs are required to perform headquarter-like activities in addition to their local 
implementer roles. We argue that this is a crucial distinction. The use of RMMs explicitly 
breaks with the traditional assumption of ‘clear separation between centralised decision-
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making (the role of the corporate HQ and the RHQ) and local decision-making (the role of 
the subsidiary)’ (Nell et al., 2011, p.87). When embodied in a single unit, these two roles 
create tensions and are potentially incommensurate.  
Our early study of an RMM assigned to the Hungarian subsidiary of Unilever – one of 
the world’s biggest fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) manufacturers – identified 
significant potential advantages of RMMs from the corporate HQ perspective (Alfoldi et al., 
2012). We also found heightened challenges of control and coordination for the mandated 
subsidiary, attributable in part to the absence of a clear separation in the decision-making 
roles described by Nell et al (2011). Nonetheless, our early study fell short of exploring what 
this meant for the implementation of the RMM. If we are to fully appreciate how RMMs may 
contribute to the effective management of complex MNEs and realise their potential benefits, 
we need to understand their nature and dynamics – in particular, how they are interpreted and 
put into practice at the local level.   
In this article, we explore two fundamental research questions: (1) How are 
headquarters-assigned regional management mandates enacted by the units involved within 
the MNE? and (2) How do regional management mandates evolve over time? We address 
these questions through a rich qualitative case study set in Unilever, where we trace the 
evolution of the RMM first assigned to the Hungarian subsidiary in 1997 through to 2007, 
using both historical and real-time data. In so doing, we contribute to multiple organisational 
literatures. 
First is the literature on dispersed and disaggregated headquarters activities in MNEs. 
Drawing on our data analysis, we present a conceptual framework – underpinned by a set of 
novel assumptions and arguments – that depicts the process by which RMMs are enacted and 
evolve. Our findings and theorisation challenge two dominant assumptions. In international 
strategic management, a prevailing assumption is that mandates and RHQ roles are 
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unambiguous when assigned (see Rugman and Verbeke, 2001). In contrast, central to our 
framework is the inherent ambiguity of RMMs. We identify circumstances in which 
ambiguity may sufficiently manifest, such that it triggers iterative cycles of sensemaking and 
sensegiving about the meaning of the mandate. Sensemaking is the process through which 
individuals and organisations give meaning to complex, novel, ambiguous or confusing 
issues/events, and develop active responses to them (see Brown et al., 2015; Maitlis and 
Christianson, 2014; Mills et al., 2010; Weick, 1995). Meanwhile, sensegiving is the process of 
attempting to influence the sensemaking and meaning construction of other people (Gioia and 
Chittipeddi, 1991). We show how these cycles of sensemaking and sensegiving lead to 
changes in the scope and governance of the RMM.  
Another assumption found in prior studies is that the assignment and dispersion of HQ 
activities or subsidiary mandates is either a unilateral accomplishment (i.e. assigned 
unambiguously by HQ, or initiated by the subsidiary) or a dyadic process of negotiation (i.e. 
shaped in interaction between HQ and the mandated unit). In contrast, we found that multiple 
units (subsidiaries and CHQ) are involved in sensemaking and sensegiving about the RMM. 
That is, the RMM is co-constructed over time by multiple units and across multiple levels 
within the MNE. Further, our work reveals that during this mandate co-construction process, 
the most intense sensemaking and sensegiving occurs at the middle management levels. By 
studying these levels, we explicitly respond to calls to consider the sub-unit level of analysis 
(Geppert et al., 2016; Menz et al., 2015). 
 Second, we make a contribution to the literatures on sensemaking and sensegiving by 
augmenting these lenses with sensitising concepts from structuration theory (Giddens, 1979, 
1984, 1991) to enrich our analysis. Together, these perspectives helped us to better understand 
the co-construction of the RMM. Although structuration perspectives are increasingly applied 
in management (e.g. Jarzabkowski, 2008; Sillince et al., 2012) and international management 
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(Dutta et al., 2016; Tempel and Walgenbach, 2007), we believe structuration theory 
complements sensemaking and sensegiving in ways that have remained largely unexplored – 
especially in relation to advancing our understanding of power and influence in organisations. 
Our study points to this potential of structuration theory, thus making a more general 
contribution to management and organisation studies. 
In the next section, we provide a brief overview of the literature on distributed HQ 
activities in the MNE, focusing on regional management mandates. We then describe our 
research method and provide case study background. With a view to making our theorising 
from this complex case more readily accessible to readers, we then present our conceptual 
framework and use it to structure our findings. We conclude with a discussion of our findings, 
and reflections on our main contributions and suggestions for future research.  
DISTRIBUTED	 HEADQUARTERS	 ACTIVITIES	 AND	 REGIONAL	
MANAGEMENT	MANDATES	
MNE configurations that involve distributed HQ activities are frequently necessitated 
by the growing size, complexity and international reach of modern MNEs. Such MNEs often 
battle with simultaneous pressures for integration and responsiveness, as well as pressures for 
ever greater cost efficiency. The most common way in which HQ activities are dispersed in 
MNEs is the establishment of regional headquarters (RHQs). A RHQ is ‘an organisational 
unit concerned with and involved in the integration and coordination of activities that provide 
the link between the region and the HQ’ (Nell et al., 2011, p.91). Although RHQ research has 
a long history, much of the extant literature is limited to descriptive or managerial 
perspectives (Preece et al., 2013). Specifically, the literature on alternatives to the ‘traditional’ 
administratively oriented RHQ is still scarce – despite evidence that MNEs use a variety of 
complex regional management mechanisms (see Alfoldi et al., 2012; Chakravarty et al., 2017; 
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Conroy and Collings, 2016; Goold and Campbell, 2002; Piekkari et al., 2010; Schotter et al., 
this issue). 
Our focus in this paper is the phenomenon of MNE corporate headquarters delegating 
certain HQ activities to local subsidiaries instead of dedicated RHQs. The most detailed 
conceptualisation of local subsidiaries with regional roles was developed in Alfoldi et al. 
(2012), from where we borrow the term ‘regional management mandate’ (RMM).  
Subsidiaries with RMMs are required to perform HQ-like activities in addition to their local 
implementer roles. They stand in contrast to dedicated RHQs, which are predominantly 
focused on a region rather than a particular local market, even if they perform operational 
tasks such as managing sales or R&D (see Preece et al., 2013).  
 The delegation of regional management responsibilities to operating subsidiaries is not 
new and has been noted under many names: ‘local subsidiary mandate’ (Lasserre, 1996); 
‘double-hatting’ (Schütte, 1997); ‘partial regional charter’ (Rugman et al., 2011) and 
‘patronage model’ (Schuh, 2013). While most of these mentions have been confined to the 
theoretical level, recent empirical research suggests RMMs are increasingly used by MNEs 
(Chakravarty et al., 2017). Compared with establishing new administrative RHQs, the 
potential benefits of assigning RMMs to existing local subsidiaries include lower costs, the 
exploitation of local operating expertise on a regional level, increased local responsiveness 
and reduced monitoring burdens on CHQ (Alfoldi et al., 2012; Chakravarty et al., 2017). Yet, 
RMMs also have limitations. For example, Alfoldi et al. (2012) found that the establishment 
of a dedicated RHQ signifies the CHQ’s attention and commitment to a region in a way that 
assigning RMMs to an established, locally-oriented unit cannot. Legitimacy of an RMM may 
well be questioned by the ‘managed’ subsidiaries who – until the RMM was granted – were 
peers (or ‘neighbours’) of the newly appointed ‘managing’ (or ‘boss’) subsidiary (Alfoldi et 
al., 2012). This represents a shift in the balance of inter-unit power. Similarly, in their study 
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of RHQs, Nell et al (2011, p.97) found that the ‘specific allocation of rights between 
corporate, regional and local levels, was in nearly all cases contested and constantly 
challenged’. Conceivably, such contestation would be even greater in RMMs, where the 
regional and local levels co-exist in a single subsidiary, necessitating ongoing negotiation and 
bargaining within and between the affected subsidiaries. 
Yet, this conjecture stands somewhat in contrast to much of the existing literatures on 
both RMMs (Alfoldi et al., 2012; Chakravarty et al., 2017) and subsidiary mandates more 
generally (e.g. Birkinshaw, 1996; Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 
1996). Both literatures have tended to assume mandate creation and development to be a 
unilateral accomplishment: mandates are developed either by CHQ or through subsidiary 
initiatives, and then fulfilled by the subsidiary (albeit often in competition with other 
subsidiaries). More recent studies (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2006, 2016) have 
suggested that there is two-way bargaining and negotiation between CHQ and the mandated 
subsidiary, pointing to a dyadic perspective on mandates. Complicating the picture, though, is 
inconsistency within single studies. For example, our own prior work (Alfoldi et al., 2012) 
explicitly characterises the MNE as a network of interdependent units, but then presents 
propositions that take a unilateral or dyadic (HQ-subsidiary) perspective (see, similarly, 
Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2016; Foss et al., 2012). Overall, our comprehension of how 
distributed HQ activities and mandates are enacted and evolve within the internal networks of 
MNEs is still fledgling. 
RESEARCH	METHODS	AND	CASE	BACKGROUND	
Research	Methods	
To address our research questions, we utilise an in-depth single case study (Stake, 1995; 
Yin, 2013) which investigates the enactment of a regional management mandate held by a 
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local implementer subsidiary of Unilever in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region. 
We compare and contrast the perspectives of members in three local implementer 
subsidiaries: Unilever Hungary (ULH), which holds the regional management mandate; and 
Unilever Croatia (ULC) and Unilever Slovenia (ULS), which are managed by ULH under the 
mandate. In our case, these units form one of Unilever’s ‘country clusters’, i.e. a small 
regional grouping of subsidiaries (not to be confused with industrial clusters). Unilever 
Hungary, operating on a local market of about 10 million people, is mandated by CHQ to 
manage Unilever Croatia (market size about 4 million people) and Unilever Slovenia (market 
size about 2 million people) as ‘satellite subsidiaries’ and act as the cluster’s link to CHQ. 
Such arrangements are especially common for subsidiaries located in countries with small 
markets (Li et al., 2010) that are relatively peripheral within the MNE, as in our case.  
We adopt an exploratory approach with an epistemological stance of social 
constructionism. Multiple respondents’ voices and interpretations are therefore at the heart of 
our data collection and analysis. Our methodological approach was closer to the inductive end 
of the spectrum, but may be best described as abductive (Dew, 2007; Peirce, 1960). That is, 
we started with broad theoretical sensitivity from the extant literature on distributed HQ 
functions in MNEs, but engaged in constant iteration between this and new theory and data 
over the life of the research. Our time frame was from 1997 to 2007, starting with the initial 
assignment of Unilever Hungary’s RMM and finishing just as the subsidiary began to prepare 
for a significant reorganisation and cluster expansion.  
Primary data was gathered through interviews between 2005 and 2007, using ‘snowball 
sampling’ in the three units (ULH, ULC and ULS). We gathered data from thirty respondents: 
eighteen from Unilever Hungary, five from each of the two satellite subsidiaries, and two 
directors with CEE-level responsibilities, based at CHQ (both of whom had top management 
experience in ULH). Some granted us repeat interviews, taking the total number of interviews 
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to thirty-five. We interviewed respondents at all except the very highest work level (WL6), 
which allowed us to build a nuanced picture of employees’ involvement in the RMM at 
various operational levels. Key data about our interviewees is shown in Table I. 
Insert Table I about here 
 
Most of our data derived from a combination of respondents’ retrospective and real-time 
accounts, collected through semi-structured interviews that were recorded and transcribed. 
We also used publicly available data sources such as company websites, market reports and 
managers’ social media profiles for basic fact-checking.  
We mainly focus on the functional department known as trade marketing. Trade 
marketing is aimed at marketing Unilever’s products towards customers such as grocery 
retailers, chemists and convenience stores (who sell the products on to the end consumer), as 
well as managing consumer promotions at the point of sale. As such, trade marketing may be 
seen as a ‘bridge’ between sales and marketing. A Croatian manager described trade 
marketing using a pithy metaphor: ‘Sales wants results and turnover, and marketing wants 
image and market share. We are in between, and we have to dance to two types of music.’  
We also interviewed respondents in the marketing department, which emerged during data 
collection as contrasting with trade marketing in how the RMM was enacted at the sub-unit 
level. In addition, we sought the views of general directors (9), HR directors/managers (2) and 
factory managers (2). 
Our analytic approach was designed not to test hypotheses, but to generate thick 
descriptions (Ryle, 1968) and to create the potential for – but no certainty of – an alternative 
‘way of seeing’ (Wolcott, 1999) RMMs. During our analysis, we triangulated mainly across 
respondents: our phenomena and events of interest related mostly to managers’ lived 
experience, with few material traces. To this end, we kept and regularly discussed extensive 
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analytical memos, mapping links between respondents, noting any inconsistencies between 
their accounts about the same event, and including possible reasons for these differences. We 
used the NVivo software to support an initially inductive analytic approach, as described in 
Gioia et al (2013). First, we identified first-order themes and patterns arising from our data – 
the ‘situationally, historically, and biographically mediated interpretations’ (Van Maanen, 
1979, p.540) used by respondents in their accounts of the nature and evolution of the RMM. 
Our second-order analysis moved to a more theoretical level in an abductive mode, where we 
examined our largely descriptive first-order findings for underlying explanatory dimensions. 
This involved a constant revisiting of the data and a search of diverse literatures to extend our 
theoretical sensitivity and grounding, challenging our emerging understandings. In particular, 
we sought to uncover and problematise our existing assumptions rather than simply reproduce 
established frameworks or understandings (Alvesson and Sandberg, 2013). Acknowledging 
the constructed nature of empirical material (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000), we do not see data as 
the ‘ultimate arbiter’ but as a ‘partner for critical dialogue’ in the interplay between theory 
and data (Alvesson and Sandberg, 2013, p.145).  
During our early analyses, we found theoretical purchase in the literatures on 
sensemaking (Weick, 1995; Weick et al., 2005) and sensegiving (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 
1991). As we carried on, we were able to discern a deeper structure in the data by drawing on 
concepts from structuration theory (Giddens, 1979, 1984, 1991). Giddens’ notions of bounded 
knowledgeability of human agents, dialectic of control, ontological security, interpretive 
schemes, norms of justification, and allocative and authoritative resources proved useful 
sensitising devices for our analysis, as we explain later. Hence, our second-order mode of 
analysis sought to generate insights of potential relevance beyond our immediate study.   
Our eventual data structure is shown in Figure 1. Sensemaking and sensegiving are 
second-order process concepts, linked to the first-order themes arising from our data through 
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state concepts borrowed from structuration theory. Our second-order concepts feed into three 
overarching concepts, with links between them depicted in our conceptual framework. For 
clarity, we elaborate each concept at the point where our related findings are presented. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Our study is not without limitations. For example, it would have benefited from more 
access to CHQ-level respondents and more subsidiaries, but was constrained by finite 
resources. The micro-level processes involved in sensemaking, sensegiving and structuration 
remain beyond our direct observation. Only a portion of our longitudinal research was ‘real-
time’ as events unfolded, and we do not trace events prior to the assignment of the RMM to 
infer earlier sensemaking and sensegiving processes. Such limitations are inherent in the 
nature of our work, and they make awareness of our role as interpreters of our empirical 
material – as well as reflexivity about our own sensemaking and sensegiving – even more 
crucial. 
Case Background  
Unilever is one of the world’s largest manufacturers of fast-moving consumer goods 
(FMCG), with an annual turnover of over €52bn (Unilever, 2016). The company manages a 
highly diversified portfolio of branded products (foods, refreshments, home care and personal 
care), operating in an industry characterised by high pressure for local responsiveness 
(differing consumer tastes, especially in foods) and the increasing need for regional or global 
integration to leverage well-known brands worldwide. During our data collection, Unilever 
was moving away from its historical roots as a federative MNE focused on local 
responsiveness and subsidiary autonomy (see Andersson et al., 2007) towards a more 
integrated structure with increasingly centralised decision-making, akin to rivals such as 
Procter & Gamble. In 2006, Unilever’s regional structure consisted of three triads, six regions 
and several country clusters (see Figure 2). Units at the cluster level were all operating units 
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(some with RMMs), while units at the levels above were primarily focused on strategy and 
coordination (RHQs and CHQ).  
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Unilever’s factories in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region were 
nationalised following the Second World War, forcing the company to exit. From the 1970s, 
Unilever re-entered through licensing and exporting, largely managed by the Unilever Export 
unit in Bristol, UK. After 1990, as CEE countries began to open up, Unilever entered several 
markets sequentially, often ‘piggybacking’ on its existing ventures. It was through this 
piggybacking logic that Unilever Hungary (ULH), established in 1991, was assigned a 
regional management mandate in 1997 to take responsibility for the so-called South Central 
European (SCE) sub-region. SCE included Bulgaria, Albania and the former Yugoslav 
republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro and FYR Macedonia. 
These were countries that CHQ considered promising markets to enter, but too small to justify 
direct supervision. Out of these seven countries, Croatia and Bulgaria already had existing 
Unilever subsidiaries which were moved under ULH’s supervision. In the other five 
countries, ULH was tasked with establishing local subsidiaries from scratch. However, in 
1999, CHQ decided to reduce the scope of ULH’s regional mandate from seven to just two 
countries (Croatia and Slovenia). The other five countries were moved under Unilever 
Romania’s supervision, for reasons that we explain in our findings. When we approached the 
company, Unilever Hungary’s RMM related only to Unilever Croatia and Unilever Slovenia. 
This cluster of three subsidiaries provided a rich, complex case for us to investigate. 
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MANDATE	AMBIGUITY	AND	CO-CONSTRUCTION	OF	REGIONAL	
MANAGEMENT	MANDATES		
 Our conceptual framework, derived from our data analysis, is shown in Figure 3. It 
presents our five core concepts – mandate ambiguity, mandate context, sensemaking, 
sensegiving and mandate co-construction – that were highlighted in our data structure (Figure 
1). Essentially, our framework suggests that there is an inherent ambiguity in regional 
management mandates assigned by CHQ to local subsidiaries. This ambiguity may remain 
latent, but may also manifest – particularly in the context of a federative MNE (see Andersson 
et al., 2007) that is moving towards integration. Through threats to identity or to ontological 
security – a sense of order, of continuity in experience, and of one’s place in the world (see 
Giddens, 1991) – mandate ambiguity triggers cycles of sensemaking and sensegiving between 
the units involved (including CHQ, the mandated subsidiary and the managed subsidiaries). 
These cycles of sensemaking and sensegiving, in turn, lead to ongoing changes in the scope 
and governance of the mandate, and thereby to the co-construction of the mandate over time.  
Insert Figure 3 about here 
We present our detailed analysis below, starting with the inherent ambiguity of the 
CHQ-assigned RMM. Our analysis is complemented by Tables II and III showing quotes that 
illustrate key themes from our data. To protect our respondents’ anonymity, we only note 
their functional department when it is necessary for the interpretation of a quote. Work levels 
are indicated for Hungarian respondents, but not for Croatian or Slovenian respondents, as the 
small size of their units means that some respondents may be identified by their work level. 
The	Ambiguity	of	Regional	Management	Mandates	
Like many others, we regard ambiguity as an inevitable feature of organisational life 
(Alvesson, 2001; Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2011; Martin and Meyerson, 1988). Building on 
Alvesson and Sveningsson’s definition of ambiguity as ‘uncertainty and incoherence that is 
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more or less continual and that cannot be significantly reduced through more information’ 
(2011, p.351), we define mandate ambiguity as the possibility that a mandate may be 
understood in terms of different meanings, of which it is not possible to determine ‘the best 
one’. However, we also recognise that human agents’ desire for ontological security (Giddens, 
1984, 1991) drives them to try to manage ambiguity in such a way as to maintain a continuity 
of experience. Through choices between competing meanings, and justifying these choices to 
themselves and to others, agents seek to reduce the negative consequences of ambiguity. The 
degree of ambiguity depends on the circumstances surrounding the mandate. We posit that 
while some ambiguity is always present, it may remain latent or unnoticed, unless contextual 
aspects cause it to manifest. 
Our analysis suggests that upon receiving a RMM for the South Central European 
(SCE) region in 1997, Unilever Hungary faced three circumstances that heightened mandate 
ambiguity. First, the mandate concerned the complex and unfamiliar task of 
establishing/managing fully-fledged operating units over an indefinite period – as opposed to 
‘hosting’ a specific product or time-bound project. Second, responsibilities included in the 
RMM were defined by CHQ at an aggregate level, without detailed directives on what they 
contained. In the words of a Hungarian manager: 
‘[We] have only one responsibility, to meet the [financial] target set for the Unilever Hungary 
Group. How this is done is less of interest to [CHQ].’ 
Third, no written charter or document was created to officially record the 
responsibilities contained in the mandate. When asked if the RMM arrangement was formally 
recorded, ULH’s former vice-chairman, an expatriate sent to Hungary by CHQ, responded:  
‘That is not the Unilever style. The decision is taken and then executed […] Of course, there was 
a formal decision, but there was nothing written at all. That is a normal development process 
inside of Unilever.’ 
These conditions created considerable scope for different interpretations and uncertainty 
about the meaning and content of the mandate, and how it might be best put into practice. 
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Nonetheless, by themselves, these conditions did not cause mandate ambiguity to manifest 
immediately. Looking at the subsidiary-level events on the timeline in Figure 4, it is notable 
that during the first three years of the RMM (1997-1999), ULH’s board chose to manage the 
seven countries contained within SCE as a business unit separate from the company’s 
Hungarian operations – much like a miniature ‘international division’. As there was virtually 
no operational contact or overlap between the Hungarian side and the SCE side of ULH’s 
business, the inherent ambiguity of the mandate caused few tensions or conflicts – and thus 
went largely unnoticed. 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
This situation changed considerably in 1999 when CHQ split the SCE cluster in two, 
leaving only the two most developed countries (Slovenia and Croatia) under Unilever 
Hungary’s supervision, and moving the responsibility for the other five countries to Unilever 
Romania. This decision significantly reduced the geographic scope of ULH’s regional 
mandate. Having been left with only two satellite subsidiaries, the ULH board made a pivotal 
decision to abolish the separate team that had been managing the SCE region. ULH 
endeavoured to bring its remaining ‘charges’ into its own operating structure, with a view to 
close functional integration between the three units. Our data shows that this was the point 
where mandate ambiguity began to manifest and led to multiple interpretations of the RMM’s 
meaning, with no clear or obvious ‘best’ interpretation.  
While we found that all respondents were aware of the basic objective of ULH’s RMM 
(to manage the satellite units and act as an ‘intermediate parent’), we found distinct 
differences in interpretations about how this objective ought to be fulfilled and by whom.  
Heterogeneity of interpretations by work level and functional department. As the quotes in 
Table II show, the meaning of the mandate – and indeed, ambiguity itself – was perceived 
differently by respondents at different work levels (WL1-WL5) within ULH. Directors at the 
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highest work levels (WL4-WL5) had been assigned relatively formal strategic authority over 
the three countries. Unsurprisingly, they perceived little ambiguity about the mandate. They 
viewed regional roles as a fundamental part of their job and discussed these in very clear 
terms: accountability for the business results of ULC and ULS, inter-unit reporting lines and 
‘cascading’ working methods received from CHQ down to the satellite units. In contrast, 
ULH managers at the lowest operational levels (WL1-WL2) were mainly evaluated based on 
their local performance (even though ‘on paper’ some of them were responsible for the other 
countries too). They noted a vague sense of connection to their Croatian and Slovenian 
colleagues and were willing to share materials, look after visiting colleagues or travel to the 
other countries if requested. However, their inter-unit contact was too limited and episodic for 
any strong sense of ambiguity to manifest. Overall, mandate ambiguity did not seem to be a 
major concern for our respondents at the top or bottom levels within Unilever Hungary. 
Insert Table II about here 
It was when we asked respondents at the middle management level (WL3) – i.e. those 
with boundary spanning roles – that we found a more complex picture. They not only had 
varying interpretations of the mandate, but also showed a heightened awareness of mandate 
ambiguity. Several of our WL3 respondents (regardless of the extent of their formal 
accountability) admitted that they were not sure (or had not been sure, at times) what specific 
activities their inter-unit responsibility entailed, as illustrated in Table II. This frequently 
proved a source of tension and conflict for them, both in terms of communication with 
colleagues and on a personal level. 
We also found marked differences in mandate interpretation by functional department. 
In the marketing department, ULH managers constantly pushed for ever closer collaboration, 
harmonisation and coordination of plans across the countries. Meanwhile, in trade marketing, 
Hungarian managers had a more hands-off approach towards Croatian and Slovenian 
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colleagues. This heterogeneity in interpretations not only affected inter-unit linkages on an 
everyday basis, but also led to different inter-unit reporting structures. At the time of data 
collection, ULH WL3 marketing managers were formally accountable for the two satellite 
units, which reported directly to them. Meanwhile, ULH trade marketing managers only had 
informal inter-unit links or ‘dotted-line’ reporting.  
These differences between the two departments are partly explained by greater 
pressures for regional integration in marketing (need to harmonise brand image, packaging 
and advertising) and greater pressures for local responsiveness in trade marketing (need to 
accommodate local trade structures and retailers). Nonetheless, a key feature of ambiguity is 
that even in the presence of clear rationales and sufficient information, it is not possible to tell 
clearly which of two competing meanings or solutions is superior. The marketing 
department’s integrated approach, despite performing generally well, led to some failed 
product launches in Slovenia with long-term consequences. Meanwhile, although trade 
marketing’s hands-off approach was widely considered the ‘correct’ one for that department, 
the low level of contact led to ULC and ULS falling behind in terms of trade marketing 
standards and innovations for extended periods. 
Our analysis of heterogeneous interpretations at the sub-unit level reveals a highly 
complex picture. Nonetheless, we were able to discover some consistent themes from our data 
regarding ULH respondents’ views about two key aspects: the nature of their RMM-related 
responsibilities (primary versus secondary) and their orientation towards the other units 
(control versus support). 
Primary versus secondary responsibility. As quotes in Table II illustrate, the RMM is viewed 
by some managers (in particular at higher work levels and/or in marketing) as a geographic 
extension of their primary responsibility. For these respondents, the RMM means that the 
tasks they have in Hungary (product and people management, planning, knowledge transfer, 
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representation at higher levels, etc.) include Croatia and Slovenia on an everyday basis. They 
showed great concern and knowledgeability about the Croatian and Slovenian markets. In 
contrast, other respondents (especially at lower work levels and/or in trade marketing) viewed 
the mandate as a secondary responsibility on top of their primary responsibilities in Hungary. 
They were happy to answer queries from the other units and provide assistance on demand, 
but regarded this as being of secondary importance to their tasks in Hungary and subject to 
their time and goodwill. They appeared less knowledgeable and/or concerned about the two 
other markets.  
Both of these contrasting views were generally accepted by Croatian and Slovenian 
respondents. Nonetheless, the ability of ULH managers to interpret the mandate either as a 
primary or a secondary responsibility underlines the contrast between RMMs and RHQs 
(whose regional role is, by definition, a primary responsibility for managers). 
Control versus support orientation. When discussing the RMM, many ULH respondents 
emphasised aspects of control (e.g. monitoring operations in Croatia and Slovenia, 
authorising budgets, giving directives and ensuring compliance). Formal accountability was 
expected across country borders, suggesting that they perceive their role (or ULH’s role) 
largely as that of a ‘boss’. Meanwhile, other ULH managers described the mandate (or their 
own part in it) mainly in terms of support: ‘an understanding’ that ULH managers will help 
Croatian and Slovenian colleagues where needed (e.g. by pooling resources, passing on 
information and best practices, solving problems) in an informal manner, but will not interfere 
unless asked. This suggests a perception of their role (or ULH’s role) more akin to that of a 
‘good neighbour’. Table II provides illustrations of both types of orientation. A number of 
respondents showed a mixture of control/support orientations through their language and 
reasoning in our interviews, suggesting an underlying tension between their supportive 
intentions and their desire for control. The potential for such complex and, at times, 
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incongruent orientations underlines the inherent ambiguity of the mandate. Again, our data 
suggests that it is the middle managers (WL3) who feel the impact of mandate ambiguity 
more keenly than others above or below them.  
Mandate Context: A Federative MNE with a View to Integration 
Unilever’s historically decentralised federative structure meant that once CHQ allocated 
the RMM to ULH, it was largely left up to the local board to decide how to enact it.  
However, from 1999, Unilever’s corporate strategy became explicitly focused on achieving a 
greater degree of regional and global integration. Our data suggests that while Unilever’s 
federative heritage created the conditions for high levels of latent mandate ambiguity, it was 
the subsequent shift towards integration and centralisation that caused this ambiguity to 
manifest. We found that the extent to which the ambiguity of ULH’s RMM became apparent 
– and the ability of Unilever members to manage and reduce its negative impact – was 
influenced by several aspects of Unilever’s changing context. These include organisational 
flux, organisational distance and connectedness, and subsidiary identity. 
Organisational flux. Our study revealed considerable organisational flux (ongoing strategic, 
structural and/or operational change within an organisation) in Unilever. At the cluster level, 
sweeping strategic changes towards integration prompted frequent internal restructuring 
within Unilever Hungary, which exacerbated the ambiguity of the RMM. Regular 
restructuring cast doubt on who exactly was responsible for liaising with ULC/ULS managers 
and how often. It also hindered the establishment of enduring interpersonal ties between units. 
The quotes in Table II also illustrate the impact of a more general flux in personnel. This was 
particularly evident in the trade marketing department, where personnel changes on various 
sides were seen as a major barrier to working together. Organisational flux also led to 
increased uncertainty and unpredictability in the internal strategic and operating environment, 
thus heightening the degree of ambiguity experienced by managers. 
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Organisational distance and connectedness. In addition to organisational flux, we found that 
the organisational distance between units also enabled the ambiguity of ULH’s mandate to 
manifest. Our data reveals two types of organisational distance between the three subsidiaries: 
geographic (horizontal) and hierarchical (vertical) distance. Geographic distance refers to the 
physical distance between the units’ management offices: Budapest as the cluster centre, 
Zagreb (350km away) and Ljubljana (460km away). While these distances may seem small, 
the lack of co-location and face-to-face contact clearly hindered the development of shared 
understandings and integrated operations, as illustrated in Table II. Further, reliance on 
telephone and email made it more likely that some ULH managers might ‘forget about’ their 
regional responsibilities and focus only on the Hungarian market. Meanwhile, the 
hierarchical distance (institutionalised hierarchy) between the three units was at odds with 
CHQ’s and ULH’s originally stated intention to ‘manage the three countries as one’. In ULC 
and ULS, even the top decision-maker (the country manager) occupied only a middle 
manager position (WL3). Meanwhile, in ULH the chair(wo)man and the functional/business 
unit directors occupied work levels WL5 and WL4, respectively. This meant that in practice, 
there was clearly one lead subsidiary and two satellite units, rather than a group of equals 
being managed jointly. This highlights the disparity between envisaged notions of the RMM 
and its actual implementation, heightening ambiguity. 
We also found that Unilever Hungary had a much higher level of organisational 
connectedness (i.e. consistent ties and points of contact within the MNE) than either Unilever 
Croatia or Unilever Slovenia. In total, eight Hungarian respondents reported having 
expatriation experience outside the cluster (including at CHQ), while none of the Slovenian 
and Croatian managers that we interviewed had such experience. ULH members at middle 
and top levels benefited from higher-level connections. Even at lower work levels, we found 
examples of ULH managers attending European meetings (see Table II). In contrast, 
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managers in ULC and ULS had much less access to these networks. These managers 
generally accepted the RMM structure as sensible and logical from Unilever’s overall 
perspective, but highlighted some negative outcomes (e.g. their lack of access to European or 
global best practices). While there was no formal barrier stopping ULC and ULS from 
contacting other Unilever units, we found that this depended on coming across ideas by 
chance or information filtered through ULH. Overall, their low organisational connectedness 
put ULC and ULS managers at an informational disadvantage, affecting their ability to deal 
with the ambiguity surrounding the mandate.  
Subsidiary identity. Subsidiary identity provides answers to the question ‘Who are we as a 
subsidiary?’ (see Ashforth et al., 2008) and helps members to understand their ‘place in the 
world’ (Giddens, 1984) as distinct from, and in relation to, others (Albert and Whetten, 1985). 
We found that the three units in our case define themselves relative to each other; relative to 
rival companies; and relative to other Unilever units outside the cluster. As such, any changes 
in one unit’s status or success may affect not only its own, but also other units’ identities. In 
our interviews, ULH members noted their unit’s much larger size and longer history 
compared to ULC and ULS, in justification of their leadership role. Meanwhile, ULS and 
ULC members cited their units’ smaller size, shorter operating history and limited human 
resources to justify their need to accept strategic direction and knowledge from ULH. All 
three subsidiaries considered themselves highly successful on their local market. In addition 
to size, history and financial performance, managers from all three countries noted examples 
of the collective competences residing in their own units. As shown in Table II, managers 
frequently linked their unit’s accumulated competence to the level of development or 
sophistication of their local market, allowing each unit to feel advanced and even superior to 
other units in some regard. 
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While the ambiguity of the RMM allowed members to develop multiple interpretations 
and justifications, the requirement to operate in an increasingly integrated manner challenged 
self-conceptions and notions of the ‘best’ way to operate. We found that these conditions 
generated threats to organisational members’ identities and their sense of ontological security. 
These threats, in turn, prompted them to engage in more extensive sensemaking and 
sensegiving efforts about the RMM. Next, we examine these processes more closely. 
Responses to Mandate Ambiguity: Sensemaking 
Sensemaking has three key elements: information seeking, meaning construction and 
action (Thomas et al., 1993). Agents construct a sensemaking object by combining specific 
information or stimuli to create a meaningful and coherent ‘picture’. Then, they use their 
consciously or unconsciously held mental models to develop meaningful explanations, make 
decisions and generate courses of action. Action forms an integral part of sensemaking, even 
when it means ‘doing nothing’ or ‘carrying on as before’ (Weick, 1995; Weick et al., 2005). 
By monitoring the consequences of (in)action, agents continually refine their sensemaking 
objects and the mental models that they use to construct and enact meaning. 
While sensemaking can be argued to take place both in individuals’ minds and in the 
collective domain (Maitlis and Christianson, 2014), it is an inherently social process (Weick 
et al., 2005). Sensemaking is ‘influenced by the real or imagined presence of others as well as 
by a person’s sense of self’ (Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2015, p.9). Therefore, any separation 
between individual and collective sensemaking is somewhat artificial. Empirically, although 
our raw data is captured through individual interviews, interviewees’ responses are strongly 
influenced by their connections to (and within) Unilever. Their rich organisational 
descriptions, interpersonal connections and cross-references across multiple respondents 
allowed us to identify patterns of collective sensemaking and make inferences at the 
organisational level. We found that the first-order themes in our data (relating to sensemaking 
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processes around mandate ambiguity) could be understood more deeply by drawing on 
sensitising concepts from structuration theory (Giddens, 1979, 1984, 1991).  
Threats to identity and ontological security as sensemaking triggers. Sensemaking is deeply 
entwined with identity (Weick, 1995) and is frequently triggered by events or conflicts that 
threaten agents’ individual or collective identity (see Dutton and Dukerich, 1991). Identity 
threats relating to the RMM are illustrated by this quote from a Hungarian manager: 
‘I think the Croatians somehow…intellectually loathed the fact that…these Hungarians were 
“sitting on a throne” above them and were telling them how to run the business. And the Slovenes 
even more, I think, because they see themselves as being above everybody – Hungarians, 
Croatians, anyone – well, they have a [very high] GDP, and they are right next to Italy and 
Austria…So they think, what the hell are we trying to explain to them about the business?’ 
More generally, ambiguous situations may also present a threat to sensemaking agents’ 
ontological security, i.e. the need for a sense of order and continuity in experience (see 
Giddens, 1991). We found two types of triggers for sensemaking about the RMM: acute 
(episodic) and chronic (ongoing). Acute triggers include shifts in the scope of ULH’s 
mandate: first, adjusting from a purely local mandate to a regional mandate in 1997; and then 
the removal of five countries from the RMM in 1999 (see Figure 4). This latter event had a 
negative impact on ULH’s identity as a successful and competent regional leader, as well as 
on ULC and ULS, whose business links with other former Yugoslav countries were suddenly 
severed. These changes necessitated the construction of new meanings about the mandate and 
how it should be put into practice. Other acute triggers included failed product launches, 
external jolts such as retailer demands and realisations of lagging behind, as illustrated in 
Table III. More generally, we found that sensemaking was necessitated by chronic triggers, 
including Unilever’s progressive shift towards integration, centralisation and customer focus; 
as well as persistent conflicts arising from the ambiguity of ULH’s mandate. 
Insert Table III about here 
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Interpretive schemes. During sensemaking, agents rely on interpretive schemes. These are  
‘shared, fundamental (though often implicit) assumptions about why events happen as they do 
and how people are to act in different situations’ (Bartunek, 1984, p.355; see also Giddens, 
1984, p.29), that form the core of shared knowledge by which one’s world is understandable. 
The interpretive schemes that managers use in their sensemaking are built on two key types of 
knowledge: empirical knowledge (what agents have experienced first-hand) and institutional 
knowledge (accepted frameworks and shared understandings that govern how things are done 
in the organisation – ‘the Unilever way’). Examples of empirical knowledge include 
managers’ own experience of what works on their market (including trial-and-error); foreign 
expatriation or work experience in different functional departments; and exposure to higher 
levels within the company. Regarding institutional knowledge, ULH middle managers and 
above (WL3-WL5) receive a constant flow of working methodologies and planning templates 
from CHQ. This creates an ongoing institutional influence on the interpretive schemes that 
they use to make sense of the RMM and ‘cascade’ to lower levels. Managers’ sensemaking 
about the mandate is also shaped by Unilever’s corporate culture. The influence of 
institutional knowledge on the interpretive schemes used in sensemaking can be subtle, or 
even overridden by an agent’s empirical knowledge. 
Norms of justification to self. During sensemaking, agents deploy norms of justification, i.e. 
the institutionalised moral principles used to justify their interpretations and actions, and 
related sanctions (see Giddens, 1984). Our data suggests that Unilever members invoke such 
norms – consciously or unconsciously – to legitimise and justify their views about the RMM 
to themselves, including what they believe to be CHQ’s reasons and expectations. Table III 
shows examples of norms of justification being deployed in sensemaking about mandate 
allocation (e.g. perceived reasons why CHQ awarded the mandate to ULH) and mandate 
enactment (e.g. focus and attention afforded to one market over another). 
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Bounded knowledgeability of agents. Sensemaking agents are generally assumed to be 
competent and reflexive – however, it is important to recognise that their knowledgeability is 
bounded in many ways (Giddens, 1979, 1991). In our case, the knowledgeability of 
individuals as well as organisational units is bounded by several factors. These include 
organisational identity, access to information, conscious or unconscious filtering, biases, 
emotions, erroneous beliefs and unacknowledged conditions. The influence of bounded 
knowledgeability on RMM enactment is illustrated by the failed launch of basic variants of 
Domestos and Cif cleaning products in Slovenia in 2001. ULH managers relied on their 
empirical knowledge (the basic variants had sold well in Hungary) and their institutional 
knowledge (Unilever’s global strategy was to harmonise products where possible), to justify 
launching the same variants in all three countries. ULH management enforced this plan, 
despite the protests of Slovenian management, who argued that Slovenian consumers would 
reject the basic variants and demand the more sophisticated variants that were available in 
neighbouring Italy and Austria. Arguably, ULH decision-makers had an erroneous belief that 
in the home care business, the Slovenian market was on par with the Hungarian market. They 
consciously or unconsciously filtered out information that was at odds with this belief (such 
as evidence that Unilever’s rivals were already selling more sophisticated product variants in 
Slovenia at the time). The basic variants indeed failed to meet the expectations of Slovenian 
consumers, resulting in an irreversible loss of sales and market share as an unintended 
consequence (see Giddens, 1984). Nonetheless, bounded knowledgeability works both ways – 
ULH’s decision to launch the standardised versions may have been prompted by directives or 
expectations from CHQ, of which Slovenian managers (given their limited organisational 
connectedness) may not have been aware. ULH’s self-identity as a successful, pioneering 
subsidiary and capable cluster leader, combined with a perception of the Hungarian market as 
being highly developed, may have also influenced decision-makers’ sensemaking.  
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Responses to Mandate Ambiguity: Sensegiving 
Sensegiving is about ‘making sense for others’ in an attempt to influence their thinking 
(Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991, p.442-443) and persuade them to accept the sensegiver’s 
meanings. As such, it is closely connected to sensemaking, and may be conceptualised as a 
possible action arising from agents’ meaning construction (i.e. an effort to transfer that 
meaning to others). In our case, sensegiving plays an integral role in the three units’ collective 
sensemaking cycles about the RMM. As with sensemaking, we draw on sensitising concepts 
from structuration theory. These include allocative and authoritative resource structures, 
referring to different types of media through which power may be exercised (Giddens, 1984, 
p.16), and the deployment of norms of justification to legitimise meanings to others – not only 
in terms of principles, but also in communication strategies. 
Influence through mobilising allocative resources. Allocative resources refer to the ability to 
command objects, goods or material phenomena (Giddens, 1984, p.33; see also Jarzabkowski, 
2008). They allow an individual or an organisation to access and deploy ‘things’ like money, 
physical assets, technologies of production and infrastructures. By mobilising its allocative 
resources, an MNE unit can influence the understandings and behaviours of members in other 
units, even without formal authority. ULH has considerably higher budgets to spend on 
training, market research, software and systems than ULC and ULS, which operate on much 
smaller markets, with proportionately smaller income generation capabilities. Quite apart 
from any hierarchical distance between the three units, ULH has far more financial resources 
that can be allocated to the accumulation of new knowledge and expertise on the Hungarian 
market (e.g. buying-in market research or training from external consultants). This knowledge 
and expertise, in turn, can be used to convince and give sense to the smaller units under the 
RMM. In contrast, ULC and ULS lack the budget to employ enough people to match ULH’s 
higher-level competences – in the words of a Croatian manager: ‘If we only have two guys for 
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producing all these [promotions], then nobody is doing strategic thinking.’ This gives them 
less power to influence managers in ULH. In addition, ULH commands more developed 
infrastructure and systems for training and HRM than its counterparts in Slovenia and Croatia. 
As a result, decisions about training and management development in the smaller countries 
are significantly influenced by Unilever Hungary. In summary, its superior allocative 
resources place ULH in a dominant position to shape how the content of the mandate is 
interpreted. 
Influence through mobilising authoritative resources. Authoritative resources refer to the 
ability to command people (Giddens, 1984, p.33; see also Jarzabkowski, 2008). They include 
resources such as formal (assigned) authority and hierarchical position that gives legitimacy 
to command, and informal authority through social contacts, information access or recognised 
expertise. Authoritative resources can be mobilised to influence the understandings and 
behaviours of others, often in concert with allocative resources (and sometimes compensating 
for a lack of allocative resources). In our case, ULH has formal authority over ULS and ULC 
– assigned by CHQ, who has the ultimate authority. Managers in ULH tend to have higher 
hierarchical positions (work levels) than their Croatian and Slovenian colleagues in broadly 
equivalent job roles. But while formal authority is an important authoritative resource, it does 
not guarantee power over others. A WL3 manager in Hungary reported that formally, they 
had full authority over Croatian and Slovenian plans. However, when conflicts arose over 
those plans, the manager was asked by higher-level directors to ‘treat the Croatians 
sensitively’ and not interfere. At the same time, many ULH managers enjoyed a level of 
informal influence over their Croatian and Slovenian colleagues’ sensemaking – sometimes 
well beyond their level of formal authority – due to their social contacts, recognised expertise 
or performance record (particularly in the trade marketing department).  
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Finally, even though ULH dominates the cluster through both formal and informal 
authoritative resources, ULS and ULC also command a degree of influence through their local 
autonomy and self-determination capabilities, as illustrated in Table III. The power to push 
back and say ‘no’ reflects the ‘dialectic of control’ (Giddens, 1984, p.16) – that is, ways in 
which subordinates can influence their superiors. Unilever Slovenia, in particular, has 
enhanced bargaining power to stand up to ULH thanks to the high GDP/capita and demanding 
nature of Slovenian consumers. As such, ULH managers have to work harder to convince 
ULS managers, while Croatian managers operating on a less developed market are generally 
(although not always) more receptive to sensegiving efforts from ULH managers. Overall, we 
found that authoritative resources are not solely held by ULH, and this shapes how the RMM 
is put into practice. 
Norms of justification for sensegiving. Akin to sensemaking, sensegiving involves the 
deployment of norms of justification (Giddens, 1984). Whereas during sensemaking, norms of 
justification may be invoked only in a latent or unconscious manner (‘justification to self’), in 
sensegiving, these norms must be articulated to legitimise meanings (‘justification to others’). 
Hence, norms of justification used during sensegiving relate not only to the principles 
invoked to justify meanings or actions, but also to how these principles are communicated. 
We found that ULH managers engaged in sensegiving draw explicitly on justification 
principles such as formal expectations by CHQ, the necessity of business risk minimisation, 
and a belief that Hungarian working methods are ‘best practices’ and should therefore be 
implemented in Croatia and Slovenia too (see Table III). Our data also suggests that 
communication strategies which demonstrate trust and tact are vital for sensegiving. We 
talked to Hungarian managers who had been expatriated to Croatia and Slovenia for varying 
periods, in earlier days as country managers (cf. control orientation) and later on as expert 
coaches (cf. support orientation). While we could not directly observe instances of their 
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sensegiving to Croatian and Slovenian colleagues, we noted that they consistently phrased 
their explanations to us in supportive rather than controlling terms, emphasising notions of 
equality and respect. Arguably, this suggests a desire to be seen as good neighbours – 
consistent with a culture of autonomous units in a federated network who are increasingly 
required to work together. For example, to cultivate an atmosphere of trust necessary for 
effective sensegiving, Hungarian managers had to learn to avoid the term ‘Balkan’ with its 
connotations of low levels of development, and adopt specific ways of addressing and 
showing respect to colleagues from the other countries, as Table III shows.  
In summary, our analysis suggests that sensemaking and sensegiving are processes 
triggered by threats to agents’ identities and ontological security, and involve organisational 
members deploying interpretive schemes, norms of justification and allocative and 
authoritative resources, under conditions of bounded knowledgeability. Next, we draw these 
concepts together to examine how cycles of sensemaking and sensegiving give rise to the co-
construction of regional management mandates over time. 
Mandate Co-Construction through Sensemaking and Sensegiving 
Mandate co-construction is a complex process that is not directly observable. 
Nonetheless, our rich longitudinal data allows us to trace key formal and informal changes in 
both the scope and the governance of ULH’s RMM to illustrate co-construction in action. 
Changes in mandate scope. By ‘scope’, we refer to the geographic domain of a regional 
management mandate. As Figure 4 shows, the RMM allocated to Unilever Hungary in 1997 
underwent formal changes in geographic scope in 1999 and 2006. In 1999, ULH’s regional 
mandate was reduced from seven countries (which were making an attractive contribution to 
ULH’s overall profits) to just two countries (Croatia and Slovenia). This was a result of 
sensemaking and sensegiving efforts by several organisational units, including CHQ. 
Expatriate top managers in Unilever Romania used their influence and connections to 
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persuade CHQ that the responsibility for less developed SCE countries should be transferred 
to their unit. For this, they drew on norms of justification such as Unilever Romania’s slack 
human and financial resources and similar levels of market development. These arguments 
were accepted by CHQ, who then gave these reasons to top management in Hungary to 
legitimate the formal reduction in the scope of ULH’s regional mandate. In our interviews, 
many ULH respondents repeated these arguments as reasonable justifications for the SCE 
split. Nonetheless, those Hungarian respondents who had been the most closely involved with 
the SCE region also voiced some criticisms, as the following quote shows: 
‘Bucharest was full of experienced expats who, for various reasons, could not perform in 
Romania according to expectations – so it was logical, from Unilever’s macro-economic resource 
management point of view, to move this “burden” over to Bucharest […] To be honest, I was 
against this at the time, saying “why should a business managed using such miniature resources be 
split in two?” – but there are many aspects within a business.’ 
Despite talking to several ULH directors who were directly involved in this event, we 
uncovered little evidence of any significant resistance by ULH. This may be because at the 
time, the chairman and many ULH board members were foreign expatriates, and perhaps 
expecting to move on in the future. As such, they were less likely to perceive the reduction in 
the RMM’s scope as a threat to their professional or national identity. In contrast, the 
Hungarian directors and managers involved, who had relatively little authority to challenge 
this decision, regarded the move as a ‘downgrade’ that ignored the accumulated capabilities 
and regional expertise of ULH (see Ambos et al., 2009 for a similar finding). Croatian and 
Slovenian managers perceived the organisational separation from units in other former 
Yugoslav countries as ‘difficult’ and ‘very, very painful’, and opined that existing cultural and 
business links should have trumped arguments about slack resources and market development 
in Romania. Nonetheless, at the time of the split, they lacked sufficient information to 
understand the decision, or the clout to influence it: 
‘I…simply cannot see what was the real reason behind that, because I was also fresh in the 
company at that time and I was not so much exposed that I could shape the argument, discussion.’ 
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While CHQ’s decision to split up the SCE region may have been motivated by valid 
strategic rationales at the MNE level, it had unintended negative consequences at the 
operating level. After 1999, it became harder for ULS and ULC to negotiate with some of 
their biggest retail customers (who wanted SCE-level contracts), and sales in Bosnia 
stagnated. Being relatively small and peripheral, the subsidiaries’ concerns did not attract 
immediate attention from CHQ. Nonetheless, by mid-2006, ULH and ULC managed to 
jointly persuade CHQ to partially reverse its earlier decision, and the responsibility for 
Unilever Bosnia was formally returned from Romania to Hungary. Using authoritative 
resources (e.g. Unilever Croatia’s strong business contacts in Bosnia and good relations with 
the newly re-established CEE team at CHQ), the sensegiving efforts directed upwards paid 
off, resulting in an increased scope for ULH’s RMM again: 
‘We started discussions about the changes of the setup, and we were supported by the CEE group 
president, who decided that from this year on […] Bosnia is coming back to us; which makes a lot 
of sense for Unilever because of organisational efficiency […] There is clear and obvious synergy 
between Croatia and Bosnia.’ (Croatian manager) 
Changes in mandate governance. During our case period, we also observed numerous 
changes in the RMM’s governance, by which we mean the manner of governing the units 
involved in the mandate. These included formal changes in the RMM’s governance structure, 
as well as informal changes in ULH’s governance approach. These changes are presented in 
chronological order to correspond with the timeline in Figure 4.  
The reduction of the scope of Unilever Hungary’s original RMM in 1999 triggered a 
move from the ‘separate division’ structure previously applied to the SCE region, to the 
formal integration of ULC and ULS into ULH’s own functional structure. Slovenia and 
Croatia suddenly appeared on the radar of managers who had previously only focused on 
Hungary, and the inherent ambiguity of the mandate began to manifest. This triggered 
sensemaking efforts about what integration meant in terms of expectations and 
responsibilities. As a Croatian manager explains: 
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‘[From 1999] suddenly we have everything together – so of course, it takes some time…to fix it 
and just to think that there are some other things now and some other countries to think about.’ 
During the initial integration period (1999-2000), the country managers in both 
Slovenia and Croatia were Hungarian expatriates from Budapest, allowing ULH a high degree 
of control and supervision. However, managers in functional departments were initially 
unsure about the ‘best way’ to approach integration. In marketing (dominated by integration 
pressures), managers viewed the RMM as an extension of their primary responsibilities and 
demonstrated an orientation towards control. In trade marketing (dominated by 
responsiveness pressures), managers viewed the RMM as a secondary responsibility and 
showed an orientation towards support (although with overtones of control at times). 
Nonetheless, during this early integration period, contact between the units in both 
departments was governed by relatively ad-hoc monitoring, planning and responses to 
specific needs. 
By 2001, the two functional departments had developed contrasting formal structures. 
In trade marketing, in keeping with Hungarian managers’ secondary responsibility/support-
oriented view of the mandate, Croatian and Slovenian managers continued to report to their 
local country manager and had no functional reporting lines to Hungary. Meanwhile in 
marketing, the increasing amount of cross-border contact and Hungarian managers’ primary 
responsibility/control-oriented view led to Croatian marketers reporting directly to Hungary 
(with the Slovenian marketing department reporting indirectly via Croatia). The accounts of 
several respondents indicate that this early phase of integration (1999-2001) was a turbulent 
time that shaped managers’ interpretations and actions through the tensions and conflicts that 
arose (e.g. failed product launches). Triggered by these tensions and inter-unit conflicts – and 
arising in part from the sensegiving efforts of Slovenian and Croatian managers – ULH 
marketing managers began to realise that enforced compliance would not work. This 
precipitated a gradual shift in their governance approach, independently of the governance 
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structure in place. Over time, cycles of joint sensemaking and sensegiving fed into the co-
construction of the mandate – illustrated powerfully in this account given by a Hungarian 
middle manager (also supported by our interviews with Slovenian managers):  
‘It was declared [by CHQ] that they [ULS and ULC] belong to us absolutely. […] In the 
beginning, this is how we understood them belonging to us: “If we introduce [a product], you are 
going to introduce it, too”. This is how we defined belonging together. […] In vain did they say: 
“We are different, we are not Hungary!” and so on, we said: “Okay, of course, but go and 
introduce it anyway!” […] After some time, as they came to visit more, we got to know each other, 
we talked more, we realised this was not going to work like that. […] I could see more and more 
that our managers were required to go out there and liaise with the marketing teams. Marketing 
approached the countries with a different outlook, and that led to trade marketing doing different 
things as well. […] This was a continuously developing thing, so it was far from perfect…’ 
In addition to these informal changes in the units’ views of the meaning of the RMM, 
we also uncovered evidence of formal changes in mandate governance over time. During the 
period 2003-2004, responsibilities and reporting lines between the three units were revised in 
a number of ways by the ULH board, with the aim of further increasing functional integration. 
To this end, Slovenian marketers were now required to report directly to Hungary (rather than 
via Croatia, as before), removing a level of separation between them and their bosses (WL3 
managers) in Hungary. Meanwhile, Hungarian marketers at the WL2 level (who previously 
had no formal link to Slovenia or Croatia) became formally accountable for Unilever’s 
business results in the two smaller countries as well. This formal change in mandate 
governance was justified by the increasing centralisation of marketing directives across 
Unilever, and the need for all marketers responsible for a specific brand within the cluster to 
work together more closely. Nonetheless, since WL2 marketers in Hungary were on the same 
work level as their Croatian and Slovenian counterparts (who were already formally reporting 
to Hungarian WL3 managers), no new reporting lines were created to accompany this stated 
‘formal accountability’. Our respondents’ accounts suggest that this situation of heightened 
ambiguity led to persistent confusion and uncertainty stretching over months or even years: 
‘It was not clear […] are the [Hungarian] brand managers responsible also for Slovenia or not? 
What is their responsibility, to what level? […] We worked a lot on it, we agreed on the framework 
and still it didn’t work. And then, you know, we repeated the whole story.’ (Slovenian manager) 
35 
 
‘We were basically messing around with it for 5-7 years, because nobody was able to say “let’s 
do it like this, or like that, and who’s responsible for what” […] Okay, it worked relatively well, 
but this depended mainly on the people. So the organisational structure didn’t really help the flow 
and the unambiguous, clear operation of the company.’ (Hungarian manager, WL3) 
Around the same time, Unilever CHQ was orchestrating a strategic shift in the 
management of its customer-facing functions (sales and trade marketing), and decided to set 
up a European sales directorate. For ULH trade marketing managers, this led to increased 
monitoring from above, as well as expectations that central directives would be fully 
implemented in every unit. As a result, ULH trade marketing managers came under growing 
pressure to shift from their support-oriented approach towards a more control-oriented 
approach. At the same time, they needed to respect the high degree of local responsiveness 
required in sales and trade marketing. Accordingly, ULH introduced ‘dotted-line’ (informal) 
reporting lines from Croatia and Slovenia to the Hungarian sales and trade marketing director 
(WL4). However, not only was this a much looser form of reporting than the formal ‘straight-
line’ reporting found in marketing, but our interviewees’ responses varied as to whether these 
dotted reporting lines even existed or not. Others worked outside the structures: for example, 
one Hungarian manager began to send minutes of meetings to the ULH chairman (WL5) who 
had ultimate responsibility for the cluster, thereby attempting to influence the behaviour of 
ULS and ULC indirectly. 
Overall, these formal and informal changes in the scope and the governance of Unilever 
Hungary’s RMM signify that the RMM is co-constructed by the units (and individuals) 
involved through ongoing cycles of sensemaking and sensegiving, rather than being defined 
or imposed by CHQ or Unilever Hungary.  
DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we have sought to understand how distributed HQ activities are 
undertaken by local operating subsidiaries mandated to manage units in other countries. We 
thus explicitly break with the still dominant view of CHQ as a single unit located at one 
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specific location, and build on the emerging body of research on distributed HQ functions in 
MNEs. Our rich longitudinal case study within Unilever enabled us to not only gain detailed 
insights into one of the world’s largest manufacturing companies, but also to uncover and 
theorise some general principles that are ‘portable’ – what Gioia et al. (2013, p.24) call 
transferable generalities – concerning the delegation of headquarter-like functions to 
operating subsidiaries in MNEs. 
Central to our findings was the heightened mandate ambiguity as Unilever CHQ 
pursued its integration strategy. In turn, this ambiguity intensified ongoing cycles of 
sensemaking and sensegiving about the scope and governance of the RMM, involving 
multiple subsidiaries and CHQ. While ambiguity may remain largely latent, its manifestation 
can reveal conflicting or alternative interpretations. Changes in the organisational context of a 
mandate can lead to ambiguity becoming manifest. This is palpably illustrated in our study of 
Unilever as a large, complex, historically federative MNE with a tradition of local 
responsiveness and subsidiary autonomy (see Andersson et al., 2007; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1989). Mandate ambiguity was present from the time Unilever Hungary was first assigned 
management responsibility for the SCE region in 1997. However, with minimal overlap 
between operations in Hungary and the other countries, each organisational unit was more 
able to interpret the RMM using their own existing interpretive schemes or scripted 
knowledge. As our findings show, it was only following Unilever Hungary’s efforts towards 
the integration of Unilever Croatia and Unilever Slovenia from 1999 that the inherent 
mandate ambiguity began to manifest overtly. From that point, members’ heterogeneous 
interpretations concerning the nature of the responsibility contained in the mandate (primary 
versus secondary) and the existing or expected orientation of members in the mandated 
subsidiary (control versus support) collided in various ways. 
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 The importance of the concept of mandate ambiguity for explaining the interpretation, 
implementation and evolution of RMMs was an unanticipated but pivotal finding of our data 
analysis. To date, the presence of ambiguity in the dispersion and disaggregation of HQ 
activities has received scant attention. Nell and colleagues’ (2011) found that a clear 
specialisation in decision-making between corporate HQs, RHQs and subsidiaries is often not 
achieved, leading to substantial ambiguity of roles, with poor consequences for employee 
motivation and satisfaction. Yet, the manifestation and consequences of mandate ambiguity 
for RHQ roles and RMMs have remained unexplored. Similarly, within the broader subsidiary 
mandate literature, we find only passing mention of mandate ambiguity. For example, 
Birkinshaw briefly observes that in many cases ‘the mandate is fully understood only by the 
subsidiary that holds it’ (1996, p.480) and that the mandate of a new venture division within 
an MNE is ‘fundamentally broader and more ambiguous than that of a research and 
development group’ (1997, p.209). Rugman and Verbeke (2001, p.237) explicitly question 
prevailing assumptions that subsidiaries can ‘somehow be assigned an unambiguous and well 
defined [mandate].’ However, despite acknowledging the existence of mandate ambiguity, its 
nature and importance have remained under-explored. 
 Outside of the literatures on dispersed HQ activities and subsidiary mandates, 
ambiguity has been subject to diverse conceptualisations. Some scholars regard it as a 
strategic tool deliberately employed by leaders to preserve strategic flexibility (Gioia et al., 
2012) or to serve certain agendas (Sillince et al., 2012). Others see it as an inherent and 
irreducible (although to some extent manageable) feature of organisational life (Alvesson, 
2001; Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2011; Martin and Meyerson, 1988). McCabe (2010, p.155) 
describes ambiguity as ‘an inevitable feature of strategic change that managers can neither 
evade nor control’. Our findings resonate with this latter view. Of course, the possibility that 
Unilever’s CHQ might also deliberately use ambiguity as a strategic tool cannot be 
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discounted. Since ambiguity confers flexibility (Gioia et al., 2012), assigning RMMs in such a 
loosely defined form may offer responsiveness and information processing benefits for the 
MNE (Alfoldi et al., 2012). This is not, however, incommensurate with our view of ambiguity 
as an inherent aspect of RMMs. We thus suggest that the importance of ambiguity is not 
unique to our specific case, RMMs or other forms of distributed HQ functions, but is likely to 
exist in most subsidiary mandates to varying degrees, whether they are product-oriented or 
administrative in nature.  
Proposition 1: Regional management mandates are inherently ambiguous. The greater 
the pressures for integration between disparate entities (e.g. subsidiaries, functional 
areas, work levels) within the MNE, the more manifest is ambiguity for organisational 
members. 
Our study shows that mandate ambiguity – especially in the context of organisational 
and national differences between MNE units – can create situations that threaten managers’ 
sense of ontological security (including conceptions of identity). These threats, in turn, trigger 
sensemaking and sensegiving efforts to manage or reduce the perceived threats and ‘restore 
order’ (Giddens, 1991; Maitlis and Christianson, 2014; see also Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2015). 
An example of such acute (episodic) triggers was the award of the RMM to Hungary, 
followed by its drastic reduction in scope two years later. Our findings also revealed chronic 
(ongoing) triggers for sensemaking and sensegiving, such as Unilever’s continuing strategic 
shift towards integration and customer focus. Organisational members engage in ongoing 
sensemaking in day-to-day activities as they detect different views (e.g. in trainings or cluster-
level meetings) on how to carry out what may seem a fairly routine activity. That is, 
sensemaking is ‘ubiquitous rather than exceptional’ (Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2015, p.S22), 
although its intensity may vary at different times and locales.  
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Proposition 2a: High levels of manifest ambiguity – especially when coupled with 
increasing levels of integration – create threats to organisational members’ ontological 
security.  
Our analysis also highlights how ambiguity and its consequences manifest differently 
across subsidiaries and at the sub-unit level, varying with managers’ work levels and 
functional departments. We found differing interpretations about not only the nature of the 
mandate (primary or secondary responsibility), but also its expected orientation (control or 
support). Further, our analysis reveals the importance of power and influence (exerted through 
authoritative/allocative resources and norms of justification) as managers engage in joint 
sensemaking and sensegiving. As our study shows, RMM-related sensemaking and 
sensegiving takes place at multiple levels from CHQ to satellite units, down to the sub-unit 
level. It inevitably involves pushing downwards (e.g. sanctions and enforcement by CHQ 
and/or the mandated unit) as well as pushing upwards (e.g. resistance and lobbying by the 
mandated unit and/or satellite units (see also Schotter and Beamish, 2011). 
In particular, we found that functional and country managers (WL3) encountered 
heightened ambiguity. This arose in part because of their role as boundary spanners – 
connecting distinct units within the MNE – and in part because of their position as ‘middle 
management’. Whereas delegating HQ functions to operating subsidiaries may appear to solve 
coordination problems from the perspective of CHQ, it may merely shift these problems to a 
location so far removed from the central locus of MNE decision-making that they become 
virtually invisible to CHQ (Alfoldi et al., 2012). This is consistent with the most senior 
management in the mandated subsidiary (WL4 and WL5) perceiving little ambiguity in the 
RMM. For the middle managers (WL3) in the mandated unit or managed subsidiaries, 
however, there is no such escape. Indeed, we found that the dual roles of a ‘local operating 
subsidiary’ and ‘RMM authority’ did not go unchallenged by peer subsidiaries, who 
questioned the legitimacy of the assigned RMM. As Harding and colleagues observe (2014, 
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p.1231), the middle manager responsible for enacting the RMM is ‘at once controller, 
controlled, resister and resisted’ – a view that also ties in with Giddens’ concept of the 
dialectic of control, i.e. the two-way character of power in superior-subordinate relationships 
(see Giddens, 1984, p.374). Experiencing this dialectic of control from multiple directions and 
across unit boundaries can challenge conceptions of one’s identity and ‘place in the world’, 
thereby triggering and intensifying efforts at sensemaking and sensegiving for the middle 
manager.    
Proposition 2b: Threats to ontological security are most acutely felt by boundary-
spanning middle managers, whose sensemaking and sensegiving efforts are therefore 
the most intense.  
We argue that the ongoing sensemaking and sensegiving efforts displayed in our 
findings lead to subsidiaries and CHQ jointly co-constructing the RMM over time. This co-
construction process does not merely involve ‘filling gaps’ by simply (re)interpreting 
unspecified expectations regarding the headquarter-like roles, functions and tasks that a 
mandated subsidiary is ‘supposed’ to perform. Instead, it requires units to actively co-create 
and sanction the specific scope, content and meaning of the mandate and shape it over time in 
various ways. Notably, this is not an unconstrained creation of RMM scope, content and 
meaning. As noted earlier, sensemaking and sensegiving processes are informed by 
underlying social structures (i.e. of signification, legitimation and domination) that persist 
over time and space (Giddens, 1979). These structures are instantiated (or become ‘real’) only 
when reflexive and knowledgeable agents communicate meanings, deploy power, and invoke 
norms and sanctions through their actions. Hence, we see regional management mandates as 
instantiations of abstract social structures (see also Jarzabkowski, 2008).  
To the extent that institutionalised social structures guide sensemaking and 
sensegiving, members of the MNE produce and reproduce these organisation-wide and locally 
embedded social structures through enacting and co-constructing the RMM. Nevertheless, the 
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relationship is not deterministic: members of CHQ and subsidiaries remain (boundedly) 
knowledgeable and reflexive agents who have the capacity to choose how they act. In doing 
so, they may either sustain or modify the institutionalised meanings, normative elements or 
power structures within the MNE (Giddens, 1979, 1984, 1991). We thus see mandate co-
construction as a process of structuration – a recursive process whereby structural elements 
(i.e. interpretive schemes, norms of justification and allocative/authoritative resources) enable 
and constrain agency (i.e. sensemaking and sensegiving). In turn, agency produces, 
reproduces and modifies these structural elements. Our arguments are formalised in our final 
proposition:   
Proposition 3: Cycles of joint sensemaking and sensegiving lead to the (multilateral) co-
construction of the regional management mandate by organisational members of affected 
subsidiaries and CHQ, through a constantly evolving process of structuration. 
CONCLUSIONS 
While the context of the MNE provides unique opportunities for the development of 
new theorisations of organisational phenomena, this potential remains under-utilised. More 
broadly, the field of international business has been criticised for failing to make its insights 
relevant across disciplines (Liesch et al., 2011; Sullivan et al., 2011). Our study responds to 
both of these laments. We show that complex MNE structures with distributed HQ 
configurations present a fertile ground for novel insights and theory building. As such, our 
contributions extend beyond international business to the broader management and 
organisation literatures. 
Our findings and conceptual framework bring ambiguity centre stage and make 
explicit a baseline assumption that has hitherto been only hinted at in the literatures on 
distributed HQ activities and subsidiary mandates: RMMs are inherently ambiguous, although 
this ambiguity may not always manifest. While ambiguity may allow a level of strategic 
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flexibility and local responsiveness, it can also lead to unintended consequences (Giddens, 
1984; Lawrence et al., 2009; McGaughey, 2013) as MNE units co-construct the RMM in 
unexpected ways. For example, ambiguity may allow subsidiary managers to interpret the 
RMM using their existing scripted knowledge, so that they may retain their preferred 
behaviours and preserve ontological security – even when this is not desirable from the 
perspective of CHQ or other subsidiaries. At other times, ambiguous and conflicting 
interpretations of the nature and orientation of the mandate may create threats to 
organisational members’ ontological security. The resultant sensemaking and sensegiving in 
mandate co-construction may also help explain the regular restructurings and reorganisations 
within regions that are widely observed in MNEs (Alfoldi et al., 2012; Chakravarty et al., 
2017; Nell et al., 2011; Piekkari et al., 2010). Our study highlights the importance of better 
understanding the manifestation, consequences and multiple responses to ambiguity in MNEs. 
We also offer a new baseline assumption about how RMMs are interpreted and put 
into practice: RMMs are co-constructed through processes of sensemaking and sensegiving 
involving multiple affected parties. At the outset of our study, this assumption was non-
obvious. Whereas RMMs – and subsidiary mandates more generally – are typically depicted 
as either unilaterally assigned by CHQ or negotiated between CHQ and the mandated 
subsidiary, our empirical study shows otherwise. Notably, when we compared what is 
depicted in the extant literature with possible interpretations of our data, we found a ‘radical 
distinction between seeming and being’ – or between ‘[RMM] phenomenology’ and ‘[RMM] 
ontology’ (Davis, 1971, p.313). In other words, even though RMMs may seem to be 
assigned/initiated unilaterally or negotiated in a dyadic fashion, our study shows them as 
being characterised by co-construction involving multiple subsidiaries and CHQ. This 
theorisation is, of course, consistent with longstanding notions of the MNE as a heterarchy 
(Hedlund, 1986) or a differentiated network  (e.g. Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994).  
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Why, then, do we so often find simplified assumptions of unilateral or dyadic 
accomplishments in the literatures on distributed HQ activities and subsidiary mandates? One 
possibility is a perceived disciplinary preference for testable hypotheses to accumulate useful 
knowledge (Cornelissen, 2017; Harris et al., 2013). This removes layers of complexity in the 
‘lived experience.’ Another possibility is that over time, assumptions become ‘formless’ and 
‘floating’ (Davis, 1971). Such assumptions may only become apparent when we attempt to 
better identify and conceptualise a novel phenomenon’s salient aspects. Regardless of any 
such speculation, we expect that this new baseline assumption will apply to many forms of 
mandate assignment within MNEs. 
Our conceptual framework and propositions are not intended to specify a testable set of 
relationships between variables. Rather, by identifying relationships between constructs and 
challenging longstanding assumptions, they serve as guideposts for further research 
(Cornelissen, 2017). Knowledge of distributed HQ functions – and subsidiary mandates more 
broadly – accumulates as studies develop new representations (models, frameworks, 
narratives etc.) that more closely match the lived experience of organisational members at 
various levels. Application of our sensemaking–sensegiving framework depicting the co-
construction of RMMs may, for example, help illuminate recent findings on the evolution of 
regional structures – including shifts from the use of RMMs to RHQs, from RHQs to RMMs, 
and the changing usage of dual models (see Chakravarty et al., 2017).  
Our integration of concepts from structuration theory with sensemaking and 
sensegiving perspectives makes a contribution beyond international management. As Maitlis 
and Christianson (2014, p.99) observe in their extensive review of sensemaking and 
sensegiving: ‘Quite overlooked, or certainly underplayed, are the social, cultural, economic, 
and political forces that shape what groups will notice, how they can act, with whom they 
interact, and the kinds of environments that can be collectively enacted…[and the] 
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opportunity to advance our understanding of power and sensemaking is still considerable.’ 
Our theorising directly responds to this observation by integrating elements of social structure 
proposed by Giddens (1979) into to our perspective on sensemaking and sensegiving. These 
elements include interpretive schemes (i.e. structures of signification); allocative and 
authoritative resources (i.e. structures of domination); and norms of justification (i.e. 
structures of legitimation). According to Giddens (1979), all social practices inevitably 
involve structures of signification, domination and legitimation, yet – to the best of our 
knowledge – we are the first to explicitly integrate them into a conceptualisation of 
sensemaking and sensegiving. As researchers increasingly seek to accumulate knowledge 
grouped by phenomena rather than by perceived disciplinary boundaries, borrowing and 
integrating across traditions is likely to become more pronounced (Harris et al., 2013). Hence, 
we hope that scholars from across traditions will build on, refine and extend our theorisation 
around the co-construction of RMMs, and further explore the potential contribution of 
structuration theory to sensemaking and sensegiving perspectives in management and 
organisation studies.  
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Tables	and	Figures	
Table I. Unilever interviews, 2005-2007 
Subsidiary unit Number of 
respondents 
Interview 
language 
Employee 
status1 
Functional 
department2 
Work 
level3 Gender 
Unilever Hungary  
Size: 400+ employees (plus around 
500 workers at 3 factories in 
Nyírbátor, Veszprém and Röszke) 
18 18 Hungarian 12 Current
 
6 Former 
5 General 
6 Trade marketing 
3 Marketing 
2 HR 
2 Factory 
5 WL4 
7 WL3 
3 WL2 
3 WL1 
10 Female 
8 Male 
Unilever Croatia 
Size: 65 employees (no factory) 5 5 English 
4 Current 
1 Former 
1 General 
3 Trade marketing 
1 Marketing 
1 WL3 
2 WL2 
2 WL1 
3 Female 
2 Male 
Unilever Slovenia 
Size: 27 employees (no factory) 5 5 English 
4 Current 
1 Former 
1 General 
3 Trade marketing 
1 Marketing 
1 WL3 
4 WL1 5 Female 
CEE regional board at CHQ 
Size: 5-25 employees (has varied in 
size and function over time) 
2 5 English 2 Current 2 General  2 WL5 2 Male 
Total 30 30 30 30 30 30 
1Current denotes the time of data collection. Two former employees still worked with UL as external consultants.  
2Main or most recent position (many respondents moved frequently). Some also moved between units at times. 
3Due to the size and structural complexity of Unilever, the definition of work levels is complicated and contains 
overlaps. As a rough guide: WL6 = global executive board, inc. directors of business lines and ‘triad’ regions; 
WL5 = regional or cluster-level chair(wo)men; WL4 = cluster-level directors; WL3 = functional department or 
country unit managers (middle managers); WL2/WL1 = operating and assistant managers ‘on the ground’. 
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Figure 1. Data structure using inductive principles 
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Figure 2. Unilever’s regional organisational structure in 2006 
 
Source: Interview data, Unilever annual report (2006) 
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Figure 3. Conceptual framework 
 
Mandate Ambiguity 
Inherent in regional management mandates
• Heterogeneity in perceived meaning at the sub-
unit level (by work level & functional department)
• Primary versus secondary responsibility
• Control versus support orientation
Sensemaking
• Use of interpretive schemes 
(empirical & institutional) 
• Norms of justification to self 
• Affected by the bounded 
knowledgeability of agents
Sensegiving
• Power & influence via 
allocative resources (command 
over objects)
• Power & influence via 
authoritative resources 
(command over people)
• Norms of justification to others
(principles as well as 
communication strategies)
Mandate Co-
Construction 
• Ongoing changes in the scope
& governance of the regional 
management mandate over time
Mandate Context 
Federated MNE with a view to integration
• Organisational flux (integration drive)
• Organisational distance and connectedness 
between units/within the MNE
• Subsidiary identities (self versus the other)
Acute and chronic threats to
identity / to ontological security
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Figure 4. Timeline of events and changes at various levels within Unilever (1990-2007) 
 
Source: Interview data 
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Table II. Quotes on mandate ambiguity and mandate context 
Mandate ambiguity Mandate context (Federative MNE with a view to integration) 
Heterogeneity in perceived mandate ambiguity and mandate interpretations 
by work level and functional department 
‘In my view, there is no ambiguity whatsoever.’ (Former ULH chairman, 
CEE regional director, WL5) 
‘They belonged to us in a roundabout way…the situation was a little 
uneven, because even Unilever could not define exactly how these two 
countries were connected to us.’ (Hungarian manager, WL3) 
‘They didn’t know what they had to do about us: is it just information 
sharing, or is there also some leading responsibility?’ (Slovenian manager) 
Mandate as a primary versus secondary responsibility 
‘I am responsible for all countries. I am physically sitting in Hungary but 
in fact I represent all three countries. So whatever forum I participate in, I 
have to think in terms of these three countries.’ (Hungarian director, WL4) 
‘Everyone did their own little things […] if I thought about who my team 
were, Croatia and Slovenia were not part of it in such an organic way.’ 
(Hungarian trade marketing manager, WL3) 
‘Whenever we asked the Hungarian team to present us something or to 
share something with us, they did it. But they didn’t do it independently 
[…] We had to initiate it because we are small, and they are so occupied 
with their everyday and current business that they didn’t think about us.’ 
(Slovenian manager) 
Mandate oriented towards control versus support 
‘The financial directors [in ULH] have always kept the Croatian books 
[…] so there was very serious control there.’ (Hungarian manager, WL3) 
‘It’s important for [Croatian and Slovenian colleagues] to fulfil the 
business expectations that we have regarding promotions.’ (Hungarian 
marketing manager, WL3) 
‘It was more a supporting role that we tried to provide, not to force them 
into an organisation they were not part of.’ (Hungarian manager, WL3) 
 ‘My boss […] was indirectly responsible for the Croatian and Slovenian 
businesses, but actually, this only meant that if the colleagues there asked 
for something or we were trying to help them, then she did so […] she was 
just trying to help.’ (Hungarian manager, WL2) 
Organisational flux (strategic restructuring and personnel fluctuation) 
‘If Unilever changes globally, this is guaranteed to affect the clusters and 
the individual countries in each cluster. So I have to say there is massive 
change in the background.’ (Hungarian director, WL4) 
‘People on our side were changing regularly […] this doesn’t help this 
co-operation and connection.’ (Slovenian manager) 
‘People are coming and leaving […] in a few years, there is a completely 
new TM department; and we somehow cannot follow.’ (Croatian manager) 
Organisational distance (horizontal and vertical)  
‘Sometimes, it’s difficult because we’re managing ourselves over a 
distance […] People don’t see you every day, so…it is much more 
managing up than managing down, you know? (Croatian manager) 
‘[Slovenian colleagues] are relatively far from us and it’s difficult to take 
them for trainings.’ (Hungarian manager, WL1) 
‘In Croatia, they are already two levels down from us, because even the 
country manager is only WL3 […] A WL3 person has a much smaller 
lobbying power than a WL5 person.’ (Hungarian manager, WL3) 
Organisational connectedness 
‘In the Adriatic, it is hard for them to feel part of a global organisation.’ 
(Hungarian director, WL4)  
‘I have attended several international meetings, while as small countries, 
they are only present at relatively few places.’ (Hungarian manager, WL2) 
‘[Our customer] was asking “What’s the strategy for TM […] in Western 
countries?” And then it was my [problem] who to ask, because I don’t 
have any contacts in Western countries.’ (Slovenian manager) 
Subsidiary identity (view of the self and of ‘the other’) 
‘Hungary is still much more developed in terms of retail structure than 
Croatia or Slovenia.’ (Hungarian manager, WL3) 
‘What might be attractive for Hungarians…does not necessarily mean 
that it is attractive enough for Croatians.’ (Croatian manager) 
‘We don’t consider ourselves as Eastern Europe because we have a lot of 
influences from Austria and Italy.’ (Slovenian manager) 
‘It’s very difficult…to be a Hungarian in a “Slavic sea” and be a leader in 
these countries.’ (Hungarian manager, WL3) 
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Table III. Quotes on sensemaking and sensegiving 
Sensemaking Sensegiving 
Threats to identity & threats to ontological security as sensemaking triggers 
‘[A conflict that] exists in every country, is “I know my own market and I 
know what is required in my own market”.’ (Hungarian manager, WL3) 
‘Our consumers were very sophisticated already five years ago; and they 
didn’t want this chlorine smell in the house […] But nobody believed us, 
nobody believed the local team.’ (Slovenian manager) 
‘Actually, I initiated now closer contact […] because I realised there is a 
lot of knowledge in Unilever Hungary, they really made a big step forward 
in trade marketing and we didn’t follow.’ (Slovenian manager) 
Interpretive schemes building on empirical and institutional knowledge 
 ‘[On setting up ULS] We solved this [task] at the local level, from our 
own resources, own experiences and ideas.’ (Hungarian manager, WL3) 
‘We are a small country within Europe, and I feel all the negatives of this, 
the lack of attention. This is exactly what the Croatians and Slovenians feel 
towards us. We must not pass this on.’ (Hungarian director, WL4) 
 ‘We have numerous policies, regulations and controls that our operation 
in Croatia and Slovenia had to be built into.’ (Hungarian manager, WL3) 
Norms of justification underpinning sensemaking 
‘When Unilever enters new emerging markets, they obviously slap them 
onto someone who is successful in that region, and that was us.’ 
(Hungarian director, WL4) 
‘The question may arise why the Slovenians do not belong to Austria or 
Italy. You could think of this as UL deciding to always manage CEE as one 
bloc […] that’s why we are managed like this.’ (Hungarian director, WL4) 
 ‘You know, it is always like big country and small country, and of 
course people are…primarily putting a focus on the places where they have 
a much bigger business and issues and potential.’ (Croatian manager) 
Bounded knowledgeability  
‘[CHQ] did not have all the information on what was the best way to 
develop these countries.’ (Former ULH vice-chairman, WL5) 
‘Croatians and Slovenians feel cut off from the world, since they only 
receive the materials in our interpretation.’ (Hungarian manager, WL3) 
‘Why does a Croatian [colleague] react in a way we think is 
inappropriate? And then it turns out that for him, this is entirely normal and 
he is not offended at all.’ (Hungarian manager, WL3) 
(Lack of) influence through mobilising allocative resources 
 ‘I did not see any local innovation in the Slovenian marketing function, 
because I think their budget was too small.’ (Hungarian manager, WL1) 
‘They often feel frustrated and powerless because they understand what 
we are talking about, they are willing to implement it, but they do not have 
the infrastructure for it.’ (Hungarian manager, WL3) 
Influence through mobilising authoritative resources 
‘[Croatian and Slovenian marketing plans are] subject to my approval.’ 
(Hungarian marketing manager, WL3) 
 ‘Hungary is, I would say, 2-3 years in front of us. But the good thing 
from that is that we can learn from that experience.’ (Croatian manager) 
‘[The free gifts attached to Unilever’s products in Hungary]…quality-
wise, were not good enough for this market, because the market is more 
demanding. So we went our own way there.’ (Slovenian manager) 
Norms of justification (principles) underpinning sensegiving 
‘They receive strategy and targets from me. As I receive this from my 
boss, this cascades down beautifully from Europe to CEE, to the clusters 
and the individual countries.’ (Hungarian director, WL4) 
 ‘[The cost allocation system] is one of those necessary things that have 
to be done by everyone, as a huge risk is created if this is not working.’ 
(Hungarian manager, WL3) 
‘[My expatriation to Slovenia] was a kind of best practice thing, to take 
the Hungarian way of working over there.’ (Hungarian manager, WL1) 
Norms of justification (communication) underpinning sensegiving 
‘The Croatians are a bit excluded, you can tell […] this brings out a 
sensitivity in them that I, as their leader, must be especially alert to […] I 
have never written them an email that did not start with “Dear X”. It’s a 
small thing but necessary, unlike in Hungary.’ (Hungarian director, WL4) 
‘We found that it would be a dead end if we said “come on and learn, 
dummy”. So we had to organise workshops, joint forums, joint work; we’d 
design things together.’ (Hungarian manager, WL3) 
‘This is the ‘lead by example’ story, so if I give them directions and show 
a behaviour that reflects this to them, this system will work.’ (Hungarian 
manager, WL3)  
